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NOTES
COMMERCIAL BANK
PRIVATE PLACEMENT ACTIVITY:
CRACKING GLASS-STEAGALL
The American financial industry' is undergoing a metamorphosis of
major proportions. Financial institutions of different molds are shedding
their traditional roles and diversifying their services in response to chang-
ing economic conditions and market demands. 2 Growing competition be-
tween varied types of financial institutions is eroding the artificial barriers
which have separated specialized sectors of financial markets. 3 The spur
1. The term "financial industry" is used in this article in its broadest sense, encompass-
ing all institutions which serve the financial needs of American consumers, businesses, and
governments. These institutions include commercial banks, savings and loan associations,
mutual savings banks, credit unions, trust companies, insurance companies, investment
companies, and securities underwriters, brokers, and dealers.
2. See, e.g., Ten Local Credit Unions Start Electronic Banking, Wash. Post, Nov. 10,
1977, § B, at 3, col. 2; Credit Unions to Offer VISA Cards, Wash. Post, Oct. 14, 1977, § B, at
3, col. 4; Banks Cash in on Capital-Equipment Leasing, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 8, 1977, at 62;
Merrill Lynch Gearsfor Banking Entry, J. OF COMMERCE, July 11, 1977, at I. See also M &
M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 563 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.
Ct. 3069 (1978) (upholding motor vehicle leasing activities by national banks); Arnold
Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1972) (denying national banks authority to oper-
ate full-scale travel agencies).
The Federal Reserve Board has permitted bank holding companies to engage in a variety
of nonbanking activities which are "closely related" to banking. See the Board's Regula-
tion Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (1977), authorizing bank holding companies and their subsidiaries
to act as investment advisers to registered investment companies and to provide leasing,
courier, and management consulting services as well as certain kinds of insurance. See also
Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533 F.2d 224
(5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978) (upholding portions of § 225.4(a)(9) of
Regulation Y).
3. See Lovati, The Growing Similarities Among Financial Institutions, 59 FED. RES.
BANK OF ST. Louis REV. 2 (1977). The report of the President's Commission on Financial
Structure and Regulation recommended the abolition of statutorily imposed specialization
within the financial industry. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND
REGULATION, THE REPORT 9 (1971). Congress and the federal financial regulatory agen-
cies have also taken several steps in this direction. See, e.g., S. 2684, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978) (a bill introduced by Sen. Proxmire to broaden the lending and investment powers of
savings and loan associations), 124 CONG. REC. S3139 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1978) (remarks of
Sen. Proxmire); Act of Oct. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-147, 91 Stat. 1227 (1977) (authorizing
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of competition has promoted greater efficiency and lower costs while stim-
ulating a wide variety of innovative financial services.
4
One significant aspect of the accelerating trend toward diversification
and increased competition in the financial industry is the expansion of
commercial banks5 into the investment banking6 business.7 To some ob-
servers, this development reflects a natural and healthy evolution of com-
mercial banking in response to competitive forces and the nation's demand
for additional capital.8 To others, it represents a dangerous attempt by
commercial banks to engage in the same kind of speculative activities
which led to the 1929 stock market crash and the subsequent collapse of
the banking system.9 Under either view, the growing involvement of con-
savings and loan associations and credit unions to join commercial banks as depositaries of
U.S. Treasury tax and loan accounts); The President's Message on Tax Reduction and Re-
form, 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 158, 171-72 (Jan. 21, 1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 113, 125 (proposing legislation to tax financial institutions on a
more equal basis); Interest-Bearing Checking Accounts--the Ban is Eroding, N.Y. Times,
May 8, 1978, § D, at 1, col. 2; Thrifts Increasing Share of Checking, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28,
1978, § 1, at 27, col. 1; House Panel Votes to Let Some S & L's Offer Check Service, Wall St.
J., June 28, 1978, at 34, col. 1; Credit Unions Permitted to Grant Mortgages, Wash. Post,
April 4, 1978, § D, at 8, col. 1; S&L's Quietly Get Right to Issue Credit Cards, Wash. Star,
May 9, 1978, § B, at 5, col. 6; Credit Unions Surging Into 'Share Draft' Plans, Wash. Star,
March 16, 1978, § B, at 5, col. 5.
4. A variety of new services is available to consumers as a result of increased competi-
tion among financial institutions. Increased services include 24-hour cash dispensing serv-
ices, customer bank communication terminals (CBCT's), automatic stock investment plans,
dividend reinvestment plans, travel services, insurance, automobile leasing services, auto-
mated teller facilities, interest-bearing (NOW) accounts in some states, and interest-bearing
share-draft accounts at credit unions. Many of these innovations have reduced the cost of
financial services for consumers.
5. Commercial banks are those institutions chartered by federal and state banking au-
thorities for the purpose of accepting deposits, paying checks, making loans, and performing
other activities related to deposit banking. See Investment Co. Instit. v. Camp, 401 U.S.
617, 629 (1971).
6. Investment banking has been broadly defmed as that business which "serves the
users and suppliers of capital by providing the facilities through which savings are chan-
neled into long-term investment," including the origination and merchandising of securities
and providing of financial and investment advice. V. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN
AMERICA iX-X (1970).
7. See Cracks in Glass-Steagall? Do the Banks Want to Gobble Up Wall Street?,
FORBES, Sept. 16, 1975, at 59; Banks. Taking on Wall Street, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 6, 1976, at
45; Banks Get Into Brokerage Business. Chemical Bank Tests the Water, 116 TR. & EST. 31
(1977); Citicorp Forms Securities Firm, Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 1977, at 5, col. 2.
8. See, e.g., Address by W. Wriston, Glass, Steagall and the Benchley Principle, before
the Reserve City Bankers Association, Jan. 31, 1977, reprinted in AMERICAN BANKER, Feb.
8, 1977, at 4; Golembe, Glass-Steagall: An Anachronism? FINANCIER, March, 1977, at 25, 26-
28; Golembe Associates, Commercial Banks and Investment Banking 49 (1976) (a paper
prepared for the Economic and Financial Research Division of the American Bankers Asso-
ciation).
9. See, e.g., Keeffe, What Is Wrong With the American Banking System and What to
Commercial Bank Private Placement Activity
mercial banks in investment banking activities raises troublesome legal
questions under the Glass-Steagall Act of 193310 which sought to remove
commercial banks from investment banking. Investment bankers main-
tain that the Act imposes a hermetic seal between the two financial sec-
tors." Commercial bankers, on the other hand, argue that the Act was
intended to foreclose only those investment banking activities which
threaten safe banking practices. 12 In seeking judicial endorsement of their
respective views in recent years, 13 these powerful banking factions have
illuminated both the Act's ambiguities and its questionable relevance to
the modem banking system. The enormous economic stakes involved
guarantee continued litigation as commercial banks seek to increase their
activities in equity markets to accommodate the burgeoning long-term
capital needs of American business and government.' 4
One almost certain target of attack by investment bankers is commercial
bank involvement in the private placement of securities. 15 A private
placement is a direct offering of securities to a limited number of sophisti-
cated private investors, which is exempt from the registration requirements
of the Securities Act of 1933.16 Approximately one-third of long-term debt
and equity offerings sold by domestic and foreign issuers has been pri-
vately placed since the mid-1960's.' 7 Ordinarily, a private placement is
arranged by a financial intermediary who brings buyer and seller together
Do About It, 36 MD. L. REV. 788 (1977); Securities Industry Association, Bank Securities
Activities." Memorandumfor Study and Discussion, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 751, 790-95 (1977).
10. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377, & 378 (1976).
11. See Securities Activities of Commercial Banks, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Se-
curities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
239-43 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Bank Securities Activities Hearings] (remarks of I.W.
Burnham II, Chairman of the Board, Securities Industry Assoc.); id. at 326 (remarks of
Robert L. Augenblick, President, Investment Company Institute).
12. See Letter from Hans H. Angermueller, Senior Vice President and General Coun-
sel, Citibank, to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Jan. 7, 1977); New
York Clearing House Association, Commercial Bank Private Placement Advisory Services:
An Analysis of the Public Policy and Legal Issues 10 (1977).
13. See Investment Co. Instit. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); New York Stock Exch.,
Inc. v. Smith, 404 F. Supp. 1091 (D.D.C. 1975), rev'd and remanded on other grounds sub
nom., New York Stock Exch. v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. deniedsub nom.,
New York Stock Exch. v. Heimann, 435 U.S. 942 (1978).
14. New capital needs for the 10-year period from 1976 through 1985 have been pro-
jected to be $4.5 trillion. Bus. WEEK, Sept. 22, 1975, at 42.
15. See Private Placements Pit Wall Street Against Banks, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1978, §
D, at 1, col. 1.
16. Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1977).
For a concise description of private placements, see R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES
REGULATION 27 (1976).
17. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, COMMERCIAL BANK PRIVATE PLACEMENT ACTIVITIES
15 (1977) (staff study) [hereinafter cited as FED. RES. STUDY].
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and negotiates the terms of the transaction.' 8 Commercial banks are
uniquely equipped 19 to perform this role and have captured an increasing
share of the private placement market in recent years.20 Investment bank-
ers argue that intermediaries involved in private placement negotiations
are engaged in securities underwriting, 21 an activity expressly denied to
commercial banks, with limited exceptions, by the Glass-Steagall Act. 22
This contention was recently rejected by the Federal Reserve Board in a
1977 study of commercial bank private placement activity.23 While ac-
knowledging that the legality of such activity is "not free from doubt," the
study found it legally permissible under the "better view."'24
The Federal Reserve study undoubtedly will heighten the tension be-
tween commercial and investment bankers and stimulate Congressional
review of the premises underlying the Glass-Steagall Act. This Note will
examine the Act and assess its future, focusing on the legality of commer-
cial bank private placement and other securities activities.
18. A commercial banker involved in arranging a private placement typically will pro-
vide advice as to the structure the proposed financing should take, including matters such as
timing, interest rates, maturity, and other terms and conditions. See New York Clearing
House Assoc., Commercial Bank Private Placement Advisory Services, An Analysis of the
Public Policy and Legal Issues 7-8 (1977).
19. Because of their frequent contacts with corporate banking customers and because
the terms of bank lending arrangements might be affected by the issuance of securities,
commercial banks are in a position to learn of a need to raise capital at an early stage.
20. Commercial bank-assisted private placements have increased from $129 million or
1.8% of the total value of assisted placements in 1972 to $1.3 billion or 7.3% in 1976. Com-
mercial banks accounted for 11% of the number of assisted private placements in 1976.
FED. RES. STUDY, supra note 17, at 2, 29-31. A recent unpublished study by the Stanford
Research Institute estimated that this share will increase to 15-20% by 1981. Stanford Re-
search Institute, Outlook for the U.S. Securities Industry 102 (1977), cited in Commercial
Bank Private Placement Advisory Services, supra note 18, at 19.
21. Securities Industry Association, Private Placement Activities of Commercial Banks
12 (1977) (memorandum to the Federal Reserve Board).
22. 12 U.S.C. § 24, seventh (1976).
23. FED. RES. STUDY, supra note 17. The study was prepared in response to a request
by Congressman Henry S. Reuss, Chairman of the House Committee on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs. Letter from Henry S. Reuss to Arthur F. Burns, Chairman, Board of
Governors, Federal Reserve System, (Dec. 15, 1976), reprinted in id., app. A. Similar re-
quests were made to the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. Neither of these agencies conducted a comparable study but endorsed the
Federal Reserve Board's study after it was released. [1977] 427 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
A-7; [1977] 432 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-12. One year after the Federal Reserve
Board's study was released, the three bank regulatory agencies jointly issued a follow-up
study of commercial bank private placement activity substantially reaffirming the 1977
study. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, FED. DEPOSIT INSUR. CORP., FED. RES. BD.,
COMMERCIAL BANK PRIVATE PLACEMENT ACTIVITIES (June 1, 1978).
24. FED. RES. STUDY, supra note 17, at 4-5.
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I. THE BANKING ACT OF 1933-REACTION AND REFORM
Glass-Steagall is the popular name for the securities provisions of the
omnibus Banking Act of 193325 which was designed to revamp the col-
lapsed banking system in the wake of the 1929 stock market crash. 26 The
Act embodies three basic Congressional objectives: to restore public confi-
dence in the banking system, insure economic stability, and forestall po-
tential conflicts of interest between commercial and investment banking
operations.27 To aid in the accomplishment of these objectives, the Glass-
Steagall provisions prohibit individuals or firms in the investment banking
business from engaging simultaneously in deposit banking activities.28
The Act also bars affiliations29 and personnel interlocks30 between com-
mercial and- investment banking firms and restricts the securities activities
of commercial banks to purchasing and selling upon the order and for the
account of customers.31 Commercial banks are permitted to purchase in-
vestment securities for their own accounts under restrictions prescribed by
the Comptroller of the Currency.32 Securities underwriting by commer-
cial banks is prohibited, except for obligations of the United States and
state and local governments.33
The Glass-Steagall prohibitions on commercial bank securities activities
were fathered largely by public outrage against bankers and excessive po-
litical efforts to restore public confidence in the banking system following
the 1929 financial debacle. The securities activities of commercial banks
25. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
26. For a detailed history of the Banking Act of 1933 and the Glass-Steagall provisions,
see H. BURNS, THE AMERICAN BANKING COMMUNITY AND NEW DEAL BANKING RE-
FORMS, 1933-35, (1974); S. KENNEDY, THE BANKING CRISIS OF 1933 (1973); Smith, Glass-
Steagall-A History of Its Legislative Origins and Regulatory Construction, 92 BANKING L.J.
38 (1975); Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking.- A History, 88 BANK-
ING L.J. 483 (1971); OFFICE OF CAPITAL MARKETS POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, PUB-
LIC POLICY ASPECTS OF BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES, app. (1975) [hereinafter referred to
as PUBLIC POLICY ASPECTS OF BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES].
27. PUBLIC POLICY ASPECTS OF BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES, supra note 26, at 3-4.
28. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 21, 48 Stat. 189, as amended by 12 U.S.C. § 378
(1976).
29. Id., § 20, 48 Stat. 188, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1976).
30. Id., § 32, 48 Stat. 194, 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1976).
31. Id., § 16, 48 Stat. 184, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976). This section restricts the securities
activities of national banks. Identical restrictions are imposed on state member banks of the
Federal Reserve System by id., § 5(c), 48 Stat. 165, 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1976).
32. Id., § 16, 48 Stat. 184, as amended by 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976).
33. Id. The exception for obligations of state and local governments is limited to gen-
eral obligations. Commercial banks were prohibited from underwriting municipal revenue
bonds--those payable from specified sources of revenue such as tolls, user charges, or desig-
nated taxes-after an adverse court decision in Port of N.Y. Auth. v. Baker, Watts & Co.,
392 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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and their securities affiliates 34 were widely believed to have fueled specu-
lation and exaggerated business and monetary fluctuations prior to the
stock market crash. 35 Sensational congressional hearings focusing on the
nation's second largest bank and its securities affiliate revealed manipula-
tive practices and banker self-dealings that were thought to pervade the
entire industry. 36 Evidence that some banks had diverted deposits into
unsound investments by financing perilous underwriting operations of
their affiliates tended to confirm the view that bank securities activities
were incompatible with safe banking practices. 37 Bankers resolutely de-
nied that such abuses were widespread. Their credibility was severely
damaged, however, by the failure of over 4,000 banks and numerous in-
dictments of bank officials for fraud during the course of legislative delib-
erations on Glass-Steagall.38 The failure of the Bank of United States in
1930, widely attributed to that bank's securities activities, was cited as
proof that the soundness of the entire banking system had been eroded by
bank involvement in the securities markets.39
In addition to inflicting financial losses on millions of depositors and
shareholders and inflaming public opinion against bankers, the failures
exposed fundamental flaws in the banking system which had fostered its
collapse. Most of the banks that failed were small, undercapitalized, and
poorly managed. They also lacked membership in the Federal Reserve
System which required minimum reserves and offered access to emergency
funds.4° Many failures had occurred in outlying rural areas which, with
the advent of automobile travel and new roads, were being served by more
competitive in-town banks.4' Because of the ban on branch banking in
most states, banks which faltered were forced to terminate in bankruptcy
34. Commercial bank securities activities were conducted largely through affiliates
prior to 1933. Securities affiliates developed after a Comptroller of the Currency ruling in
1902 interpreting the National Banking Act as disallowing direct bank involvement in un-
derwriting and distribution of equity securities. The Comptroller later recommended legis-
lation to permit national bank underwriting of investment securites but such legislation was
not enacted until 1927. PUBLIC POLICY ASPECTS OF BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES, supra
note 26, at app. 5, 8. See also W.N. PEACH, THE SECURITY AFFILIATES OF NATIONAL
BANKS (1941).
35. S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-10 (1933); 77 CONG. REC. 4028 (1933) (re-
marks of Rep. Fish).
36. Hearings on S Res. No. 71 Before a Subcomm of the Senate Comm. on Banking &
Currency, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1931) [hereinafter cited as 1931 Hearings]. See S. KEN-
NEDY, supra note 26, at 108-28.
37. S. REP. No. 77, supra note 35, at 10.
38. PUBLIC POLICY ASPECTS OF BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES, supra note 26, at 4.
39. 1931 Hearings, supra note 36, at 116-17, 1017, 1068.
40. Id. at 34, 46, 396.
41. Id. at 7, 252-53, 375.
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rather than through acquisition by a healthy bank as a going concern.42
The power of the Federal Reserve Board and the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency to discipline unsafe banking practices was found to be insufficient.43
The Comptroller, for example, lacked power to remove bank officers and
had no authority to examine bank security affiliates. The laxity of the
Federal Reserve Banks in allowing banks to use the discount window in-
discriminately for rediscounting notes that financed securities purchases
was found to have aggravated speculation."
The fundamental defects in the banking system were repaired by the
Banking Act of 1933, which introduced the federal deposit insurance sys-
tem among other much-needed reforms.45 Public hostility toward bank
securities activities aroused by the banking collapse and the exposure of
bank misdealings in the stock market, however, spurred Congress to em-
brace the banking philosophy of Senator Carter Glass. 46 Architect of the
1913 Federal Reserve Act and other banking legislation for over a quarter
of a century, Glass viewed investment banking as alien to the proper and
traditional role of commercial banks.47 Glass espoused the so-called com-
mercial loan theory that banks should be confined to making short-term
loans to finance the production of goods. 48 Corporate financing through
the public securities markets was viewed with suspicion by Glass and
others, who distrusted the wisdom of the ordinary investor and believed
that securities financing diminished desirable bank control over the alloca-
tion of capital.49 Many members of Congress shared Glass' view that the
tie between commercial and investment banking impaired the ability of
commercial banks to function as impartial allocators of credit and disinter-
42. Id. at 34.
43. Id. at 7, 20, 39, 47-48.
44. Id. at 50-51.
45. The Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162-95 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.), prohibited the payment of interest on demand accounts, gave the Comptroller of
the Currency and the Federal Reserve Board authority to examine affiliates of banks and to
remove bank directors who engaged in unsafe or unsound banking practices, expanded the
power of national banks to branch, and provided for more rigid control over capital require-
ments of federally supervised banks, in addition to other provisions.
46. Senator Glass was chairman of the subcommittee which drafted the Glass-Steagall
Act. As former Secretary of the Treasury under President Wilson and Chairman of the
Senate Appropriations Committee as well, he wielded considerable power in the Senate.
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 115 (Joint Comm. Print 1977). Glass was instrumental in incorporating a provision
calling for the divorce of commercial banks from investment banking in the 1932 Demo-
cratic platform. Perkins, supra note 26, at 518.
47. See PUBLIC POLICY ASPECTS OF BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES, supra note 26, at
app. 12-15.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 13-14.
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ested investment advisers. A parent bank seeking to promote its under-
writing affiliate might favor customers who borrowed funds to purchase
securities from the affiliate or extend credit on favorable terms to compa-
nies in which its affiliate had invested. Commercial banks might be
tempted to promote the sale of unmarketable securities to their unwitting
customers or correspondent banks, or even to their own trust accounts.50
These hazards, Glass and the Seventy-Third Congress concluded, made it
necessary to sever commercial banks from the securities industry.
Two years after the divorce between commercial and investment bank-
ing was imposed, however, depressed business conditions prompted sec-
ond thoughts about the wisdom of such a drastic measure. Senator Glass
sought to amend the Glass-Steagall Act to permit commercial banks to
underwrite corporate securities to a moderate extent in order to aid the
faltering heavy goods industries. 5' In spite of the enactment of the Securi-
ties Acts of 193352 and 1934,53 which subjected the securities industry to
extensive regulation, a majority of the Congress adhered to the rigid sepa-
ration of commercial banks from investment banking activities. 54 Al-
though the statutory line between commercial and investment banking
remained firmly fixed, latent ambiguities in the language and purpose of
Glass-Steagall persisted. These ambiguities have been illuminated in re-
cent years as commercial banks have innovatively sought to engage in se-
curities activities within the Act's parameters.
II. THROUGH THE JUDICIAL LOOKING GLASS
In 1965, the Comptroller of the Currency endorsed a national bank's
plan to offer a mutual investment service. 55 The plan enabled individual
customers to pool their funds to take advantage of the bank's financial
expertise developed in the management of large trust accounts. The in-
vestment scheme combined three unquestioned legal activities: the pooling
50. Id. at 32 & app. 18-21.
51. 79 CONG. REC. 11933 (1935) (remarks of Senator Glass).
52. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1976).
53. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
54. The Glass amendment won Senate endorsement but failed to gain the approval of
the House of Representatives. H. CONF. REP. No. 1822, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1935).
55. The plan was approved under 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (1970). It involved the operation of
a mutual fund in which customers who invested were given units of participation. Partici-
pation units were freely redeemable and transferable to anyone who had a managing agency
account at the bank.
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of trust assets, 5 6 the management of individual agency accounts, 57 and the
purchase of stock for individual customer accounts.5 8 In Investment Com-
pany Institute v. Camp,59 however, the Supreme Court held this combina-
tion invalid under the Glass-Steagall Act. Declaring that the purpose of
the Act was to "prohibit commercial banks. . . from going into the invest-
ment banking business,"'60 the Court relied on the underlying Congres-
sional policy that spurred its enactment in testing whether the mutual fund
involved a forbidden sale of securities. After identifying the financial
hazards which had concerned the Seventy-Third Congress, the Court ex-
amined the mutual fund to detect similar dangers. It found that promo-
tional pressures resulting from the bank's "salesman's interest" in the fund
could tempt the bank to rescue faltering investments through unsound
banking measures. Moreover, the bank's pecuniary and reputational
stake in the fund could distort its credit decisions to favor purchasers of
interests in the fund or firms in whose securities the fund had invested.
Additionally, talent and resources of the bank might be diverted from its
commercial banking operations and, if the fund's investments turned sour,
the bank would suffer a loss of public confidence and risk insolvency.
6
'
The Court declined to be influenced by the argument that the hazards of
commercial bank involvement in securities activities are outweighed by the
benefits of increased competition, convenience, and expertise that they
bring to the investment market.62 A contrary balance had been struck by
Congress forty years earlier, the Court observed. It did not assume the
power to reopen the balance, thereby ignoring the impact of subsequent
regulatory measures which could have neutralized the effect of the hazards
it perceived. 63 By focusing on the "more subtle hazards" 64 which Glass-
56. The legal authority of commercial banks to pool trust assets is generally recognized
as a proper and traditional bank activity. Investment Co. Instit. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 625
(1971).
57. The management of individual agency accounts is authorized by 12 U.S.C. § 92a
(1976).
58. Id. § 24 authorizes the purchase of stock for the account of customers.
59. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
60. Id. at 629.
61. Id. at 630-38.
62. Id. at 630.
63. Former Comptroller of the Currency, James E. Smith, criticized the Court's analysis
as an attempt "to apply a legislative remedy which was fashioned with certain specific
abuses committed at a certain period of history to a different service being carried out at a
different historical period" which ran the risk of becoming "arbitrary and artificial." 1975
Bank Securities Activities Hearings, supra note 11, at 193. The plasticity of the Court's test
was demonstrated by Justice Blackmun in dissent. Challenging the majority's attempt to
distinguish the dangers of commercial bank operation of a mutual investment fund as op-
posed to a mutual trust fund, he argued that the same possibilities for abuse and threat to
bank stability exist in both. 401 U.S. 617, 644 (1971). Blackmun similarly found no basis
in the language of the Glass-Steagall Act for the majority's holding that the combination of
otherwise lawful commercial bank activities renders them unlawful. Id. at 645.
64. Id. at 617, 630.
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Steagall was designed to expunge, the Court demonstrated the Act's po-
tency. By carefully limiting its decision to the type of mutual fund at is-
sue, 65 however, the Court invited further commercial bank attempts to
devise investment schemes compatible with Glass-Steagall. Commercial
banks were not long in responding to the invitation.
In June of 1974, the Comptroller of the Currency approved a national
bank's plan to offer an automatic stock investment service-AIS. Plan
participants could designate small sums to be deducted automatically from
their accounts each month and invested in one of a number of blue-chip
securities. 66 The Investment Company Institute67 was joined by the New
York Stock Exchange in challenging the alleged intrusion into forbidden
investment banking territory. In New York Stock Exchange, Inc. v.
Smith,68 the District Court for the District of Columbia sustained the AIS
plan, finding it unobjectionable under either the language or the spirit of
Glass-Steagall. The court observed that section 16 of the Act authorizes
national banks to purchase and sell securities as agents of their customers
if the transaction is without recourse, at the request of customers, and for
customer accounts. The AIS plan met each requirement.69 The district
court did not evaluate the combined legal effect of the bank's activities as
the Supreme Court had done in ICI v. Camp. It did examine the poten-
tial hazards posed by the AIS plan, however, and by detecting subtle dif-
ferences and relying on existing regulatory reforms as safeguards against
potential abuse, it found the activity beyond the reproach of Glass-Stea-
gall.70 In the court's view, the most significant factor distinguishing the
65. Id. at 638.
66. Funds designated for investment under the plan were held by the bank in a com-
mon investment account. The bank had 30 days in which to purchase stocks upon the order
of customers, and the stocks were held in the bank's name. When a customer sold his stock,
the bank could match the sell order with a buy order from another customer. Unlike the
mutual investment fund challenged in ICI v. Camp, the AIS made no recommendation as to
the merits of any individual stock and each customer made his own securities selection.
The only stocks available for investment under the plan were the 25 stocks having the high-
est aggregate market value of outstanding stock on Standard & Poor's 425 Industrial Index.
67. The Investment Company Institute is an association of open-ended investment com-
panies, advisors, and underwriters.
68. 404 F. Supp. 1091 (D.D.C. 1975), rev'd and remanded on other grounds sub nom.,
New York Stock Exch. v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. deniedsub nom., New
York Stock Exch. v. Heimann, 435 U.S. 942 (1978).
69. 404 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (D.D.C. 1975).
70. In response to the plaintiffs' argument that the AIS plan posed a potential for abuse
since the bank could use the AIS funds interest-free during the thirty day float, the court
reasoned that customers were fully aware of the potential conflict when they chose to par-
ticipate and that federal bank examiners would detect any abuse. Id. at 1100. In response
to the plaintiffs' argument that AIS customers were unprotected under the Securities Inves-
tor Protection Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1636 (1970), (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 (o), 78 (aaa)-
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AIS plan from the mutual fund struck down in ICI v. Camp was the ab-
sence of any responsibility for investment decisions on the part of the bank
which could jeopardize public confidence.7'
III. PRIVATE PLACEMENTS: COMMERCIAL BANKERS STRIKE AGAIN
The Comptroller of the Currency initially took a more cautious ap-
proach toward commercial bank private placement activity than toward
commercial bank operation of mutual investment funds and AIS plans.72
As recently as 1975, the Comptroller's Office viewed commercial bank in-
volvement in private placement negotiations as lying "at the heart of the
investment banking business" and of questionable legality under Glass-
Steagall.73 Relying on the views of the Comptroller, the Federal Reserve
Board in December of 1976 denied permission to the First Arabian Corpo-
ration, a newly formed bank holding company, to retain more than a five
percent interest in a corporation engaged in the private placement busi-
ness. Reiterating the Glass-Steagall divorce policy enunciated in ICI v.
Camp, the Board concluded that the subsidiary corporation's participation
in private placement negotiations transgressed too far into investment
banking terrain.74 Six months thereafter, the Board released a staff study
78(1/1) (1976)), the court pointed out that such customers are protected by federal deposit
insurance. 404 F. Supp. 1091, 1101 (D.D.C. 1975).
71. Id. at 1100.
72. National banks were authorized by interpretive ruling to serve as "finders" in mak-
ing private placements when the bank's activity was limited to introducing the parties and it
took no part in the negotiations. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7200 (1977).
73. The Deputy Comptroller of the Currency in early 1975 warned that bankers sub-
stantially participating in negotiations between client and purchaser "may well be engaged
in underwriting, selling or distributing securities in violation of the Glass-Steagall Act."
Bankers who promised to use only their "best efforts" to market a securities issue and ac-
cepted a fee contingent upon successful marketing "undoubtedly" were involved in such
activity. Letter from Justin T. Watson, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency, to Joe Selby,
Regional Administrator of National Banks, (Jan. 15, 1975), reprinted in Securities Industry
Association, Bank Securities Activities. Memorandumfor Study and Discussion, 14 SAN Di-
EGO L. REv., 751, 811-12 (1977). The Comptroller never took the position that national
bank private placement activity in fact violated the Act, however, and in 1976 the Office
announced that it was actively reconsidering its former views. AMERICAN BANKER, June
14, 1976, at 1, col. 2.
74. 63 FED. RES. BULL. 68 (1977). Section 225.4(g)(2)(v) of the Board's Regulation Y
applies the Glass-Steagall restrictions to bank holding companies. For background and
discussion of the application of the Glass-Steagall Act to bank holding companies, see
Golembe Associates, Inc., Bank Holding Companies and the Glass-Steagall Act (July 24,
1975) (prepared for Ass'n of Registered Bank Holding Companies). The Board's decision
provoked an immediate response from the nation's biggest banks protesting its broad sweep.
If a bank holding company subsidiary's participation in private placement negotiations vio-
lated the strictures of Glass-Steagall, it seemed to follow a fortiori that a national bank's
direct involvement in the same activity was unlawful. Securities Industry Assoc., Private
Placement Activities of Commercial Banks 18-20 (1977). In a letter to the Board of Gover-
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of commercial bank private placement activities which substantially con-
flicted with its earlier view.75 The study concluded that commercial bank
private placement activity was not barred by Glass-Steagall and offered
appreciable public benefits by increasing competition in the private place-
ment market.76
In contrast to the policy-oriented approach of the ICI v. Camp and
NYSE v. Smith opinions, the Federal Reserve Board study's analysis of
the legal aspects of commercial bank private placement activity took a def-
initional approach. It focused on two basic questions: whether commer-
cial bank assistance in private placements constitutes underwriting or
selling of securities prohibited by the Act, and whether such activity
amounts to engaging in the "business of dealing in securities" which,
under the Act, must be confined to purchasing and selling without re-
course for the account of customers.77 By taking advantage of the absence
of clear definitions in the Act and selectively drawing on definitions from
the Securities Act of 1933, the study put private placement activities
outside the reach of Glass-Steagall.
The study used tortuous reasoning to escape the conclusion that com-
mercial banks engage in underwriting when performing an intermediary
role in private placements. 78 In this role, the study correctly asserted,
banks do not act as "firm commitment" underwriters since they do not
purchase securities for resale to third parties. Their role does bear a dis-
turbing resemblance to "best efforts" underwriting, however, which entails
nors, the Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Citibank pointed out that the only
feasible way of financing certain major financial transactions in order to meet the capital
needs of industry is through multi-bank loan syndicates combined with long-term debt obli-
gations placed directly with institutional investors. Moreover, such a definitive interpreta-
tion at a time when the Comptroller and other federal agencies, including the Board itself,
were studying the private placement question at the request of Congress was inappropriate.
Letter from Hans A. Angermueller, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Citibank,
New York, to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Jan. 7, 1977). Two
days prior to the issuance of the First Arabian decision, Chairman Henry Reuss of the
House Banking Committee had written to the three federal bank regulatory agencies re-
questing each to study and report on the private placement activity of commercial banks
within six months. The Board subsequently issued a letter stating that it had not intended
the First Arabian decision to apply to national banks and that such a determination of the
issue would be premature in light of ongoing study. [1973-78 Transfer Binder] FED. BANK-
ING L. REP. (CCH) 82,300.
75. FED. RES. STUDY, supra note 17.
76. Id. at 4-5. In addition to the legal aspects of commercial bank private placement
activity, the study examined the nature of the private placement market, available data
sources concerning private placements, the effect of commercial bank private placement ac-
tivity on competition and concentration within the investment banking industry, and related
regulatory issues.
77. Id. at 81.
78. Id. at 87-89.
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selling securities as an agent rather than as a dealer.79 The 1933 Securities
Act definition of "underwriter" includes best efforts underwriters. 80 The
study conceded that commercial bank involvement in private placement
negotiations for a contingent fee could be construed as best efforts under-
writing.81 But "even if" it were deemed to be such, the study argued, that
would not necessarily put it within the forbidden zone of Glass-Steagall.
The Securities Act definition of underwriter applies only to persons in-
volved with public, as opposed to private, offerings of securities. Neither
best efforts nor firm commitment underwriters whose activities are con-
fined to private placements are considered underwriters for purposes of
that Act, the study pointed out.82 Parenthetically, it added that the Secur-
ities Act definition is not controlling for Glass-Steagall purposes.83 With-
out that concession, under the study's reasoning a commercial bank could
engage in firm commitment underwriting without violating the Glass-
Steagall Act as long as there was no public offering.
The study's analysis of whether commercial bank private placement ac-
tivity amounts to "selling" securities within the meaning of the Glass-Stea-
gall Act was equally tortured.84 The study conceded that under the
Securities Act a bank which solicits parties or actively participates in ar-
ranging a private placement is arguably engaged in selling securities. But
"even if" such activity were selling, the study detected a possible escape
hatch in the Glass-Steagall provision allowing commercial banks to sell
securities for the account of customers. One plausible interpretation of
the term "customer," however, would confine it to persons having a pre-
existing relationship with the bank unrelated to its private placement serv-
ices. The study hurdled this question by concluding that private place-
ment activity does not expose a commercial bank to the risks of fluctuating
securities values at which Glass-Steagall was aimed, and thus can claim
the customer exemption irrespective of any definitional conflict.85
79. L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 171-72 (student ed. 1961).
80. Section 2(l) of the Securities Act of 1933 broadly defines as an underwriter "any
person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in
connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect
participation in any such undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the direct or
indirect underwriting of any such undertaking .... "15 U.S.C. § 77b(1 1) (1976). See
Dale v. Rosenfeld, 229 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1956).
81. FED. RES. STUDY, supra note 17, at 88.
82. Id at 89.
83. See Miller, The Particpation of National Banks in Private Placements of Corporate
Securities, 13 N. ENG. L. REV. 63, 76-81 (1977), rejecting a definitional analysis of commer-
cial bank private placement activity based on the Securities Act of 1933.
84. FED. RES. STUDY, supra note 17, at 93-99.
85. Id. at 95-99.
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In addition to its definitional analysis, the Federal Reserve study also
examined whether commercial bank private placement activity created
other hazards of the type that Glass-Steagall was designed to forestall. It
found that commercial banks have handled relatively secure private place-
ments, that bank supervisory and regulatory agencies are able to detect
and correct any possible conflicts of interest or self-dealing, and that pri-
vate placements account for a small, albeit growing, portion of commercial
banking business.86 To qualify for the private offering exemption under
the Securities Act of 1933, the study emphasized, buyers in private place-
ment transactions must have sufficient knowledge and sophistication to
evaluate the risks and merits of a particular investment without depending
on the advice of a commercial bank.87 Finally, no bank funds are placed
directly at risk in a private placement since the role of the bank is limited
to that of an intermediary. 88 While a bank might extend credit to a firm
in exchange for its private placement business, the study found no evi-
dence of such practice. 89
Whether the policy considerations enumerated by the Federal Reserve
study should be sufficient to overcome the definitional difficulties of com-
mercial bank compliance with the language of Glass-Steagall in negotiat-
ing private placements is questionable. The study's reliance on reforms
post-dating or contemporaneous with the Glass-Steagall Act as safeguards
against commercial bank abuse in facilitating private placements is at odds
with the approach of ICI v. Camp. To the extent that regulation of the
banking and securities industries has eliminated threats to bank soundness
and conflicts of interest associated with commercial bank involvement in
investment banking activity, the study implicitly questions the current rele-
vance of Glass-Steagall. Such questioning raises the fundamental legal
issue of whether subsequent reforms can legitimately be used to render an
unrepealed statute impotent. While the Federal Reserve study and the
NYSE v. Smith opinion suggest an affirmative answer, the Supreme Court
has declined to endorse this position. Any expansion of commercial bank
securities activities may thus have to proceed on a course charted by Con-
gress.
86. Id. at 63-77.
87. See Securities Act of 1933, Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1977); SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); SEC v. Continental Tobacco, 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972);
Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
88. FED. RES. STUDY, supra note 17, at 76.
89. The study did disclose, however, that almost one quarter of commercial bank as-
sisted private placements entailed some bank financing. Id. at 2 and 74.
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IV. REDEFINING THE ROLES OF COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT
BANKERS
Commercial and investment banking institutions have come under in-
creasing Congressional scrutiny in recent years. 90 The Congressional con-
sensus generally endorses a relaxation of artificial barriers within both
industries in order to enhance competition and economic efficiency. 9 1
Legislation authorizing broader commercial bank involvement in certain
realms of the securities markets has been introduced and considered. 92
Incorporation of investment banking subsidiaries abroad by U.S. commer-
cial banks in recent years without Congressional interference evidences a
growing tolerance of commercial bank securities activities.9 3 The rigid
separation policy of Glass-Steagall thus appears to have little chance of
90. See The Safe Banking Act of 1977, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Insti-
tutions Supervision, Regulation & Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance & Ur-
ban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Federal Bank Commission Act, Hearings on S. 2298
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976);
Financial Institutions and the Nation's Economy, Discussion Princples: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation & Insurance of the House Comm.
on Banking, Currency & Housing, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Securities Activities of Com-
mercial Banks, Hearings on the Expansion of Commercial Banks' Securities Operations and
the Elimination of Barriers between the Banking and Securities Industries Before the Sub-
comm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975); SUBCOMM. ON SECURITIES OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING
AND URBAN AFFAIRS, SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, S. Doc. No. 93-13, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973); STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
BANKING & CURRENCY, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: REFORM AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS,
93rd Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
AND REGULATION (Comm. Print 1973).
91. See, e.g., SENATE BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS COMM., SECURITIES
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1975, S. REP. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in
[1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 179, 181.
92. See, e.g., S. 2674, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (a bill introduced by Senator William
Proxmire to permit commercial banks to underwrite municipal revenue bonds). The Senate
passed similar legislation in 1967 and 1974 but the bank underwriting provision was
dropped in conference with the House. S. 3838, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC.
30625-30 (1974); H. CONF. REPT. No. 93-1440, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 120
CONG. REC. 34427, 34428 (1974). Numerous exceptions to the Glass-Steagall ban on com-
mercial bank underwriting activities have been adopted since its enactment, generally to
permit banks to underwrite new housing or international agency obligations. See Rogow-
ski, Commercial Banks and Municipal Revenue Bonds, 95 BANKING L.J. 155, 162 (1978).
The House Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs recently approved legisla-
tion that would retain the present exemption from the Glass-Steagall Act for foreign banks
operating in the United States. H.R. 7325, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). The President's
Commission on Financial Structure and Regulation recommended legislation to permit
banks to manage and sell mutual investment funds and to give them limited equity invest-
ment authority. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
AND REGULATION 42-43 (1971).
93. Merchant Banking- Is the U.S. Ready for It, Bus. WEEK, April 19, 1976, at 54.
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long-term survival. Although Congressional concern about potential con-
flicts of interest remains alive,94 a trend toward regulation, rather than re-
striction, of commercial bank investment activities is emerging. 95 How far
this trend will go and what it means for the future of Glass-Steagall cannot
easily be predicted. 96 As commercial banks are given increased entry into
investment banking, investment bankers undoubtedly will demand liberal-
ized entry into commercial banking activities. 97 Reexamination by Con-
gress of the entire philosophical framework of the Glass-Steagall Act
appears to be an inevitable necessity.98
Congressional timidity in considering the complete removal of the
Glass-Steagall yoke from commercial and investment banks is unwar-
94. See, e.g., Letter from Henry S. Reuss, Chairman of the House Banking, Finance,
and Urban Affairs Committee, to John G. Heimann, Comptroller of the Currency, (Dec. 19,
1977).
95. See, e.g., S. 2131, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S15371-74 (1977) (a bill
introduced by Senator Williams, Chairman of the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, directing the federal bank regulatory
agencies to promulgate rules and regulations governing the brokerage and dealer activities
of commercial banks).
96. The Act's ban on firm commitment underwriting by commercial banks is one provi-
sion likely to survive the current reform movement. In its 1975 hearings on bank securities
activities, the Senate Subcommittee on Securities viewed the provision as largely unques-
tioned. In testimony before the Subcommittee, however, former Securities and Exchange
Commission Chairman Roderick Hills pointed out that if increasing commercial bank com-
petition in other areas of the securities industry weakened the industry's underwriting capac-
ity, commercial banks might be needed to supplant that capacity. 1975 Bank Securities
Activities Hearings, supra note 11, at 139. See Plotkin, What Meaning Does Glass-Steagall
Havefor Today's Financial World?, 95 BANKING L.J. 404, 418 (1978).
97. That this is more than a mere possibility was demonstrated by the introduction in
1977 of the "cash management account" by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith. The
fund enables brokerage customers to borrow, write checks, make VISA card purchases, de-
posit funds, and earn interest on funds held in their margin accounts. Merrill Lynch. The
Bull in Banking's Shop, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 8, 1977, at 50; Merrill Lynch Takes on the Banks,
Wash. Post, July 3, 1977, § G at 1, col. 3. The Federal Reserve Board has told Merrill
Lynch that it is "concerned" about possible ramifications of the new account. Deferring to
the Justice Department for enforcement of the Glass-Steagall Act, however, the Board stated
that the account "doesn't appear to violate" any laws within its authority. The Justice De-
partment has raised no objection to the Merrill Lynch plan. Wall St. J., July 20, 1977, at 4,
col. 2. The state banking authorities of Colorado and Oregon, however, have barred the
service as an unauthorized intrusion into commercial banking. Wall St. J., May 30, 1978, at
13; June 2, 1978, at 11.
98. Comptroller of the Currency John Heimann recently called for a "thorough review"
of the Glass-Steagall Act. Wash. Post, April 18, 1978, § D at 11, col. 3. The Securities
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs currently
is conducting an extensive study of bank brokerage-related and investment advisory serv-
ices, but does not plan to review the Glass-Steagall ban on commercial bank underwriting of
corporate securites. SUBCOMM. ON SECURITIES OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING,
Housn'G AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., THE SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF COM-
MERCIAL BANKS, STUDY OUTLINE IV (Comm. Print 1975).
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ranted. There is nothing sacrosanct about maintaining a locked door be-
tween the two banking sectors. Many economically stable European
countries have successfully blended commercial and investment banking
without jeopardizing the health of their banking systems. In Germany,
for example, so-called "universal banks" are permitted to accept deposits,
underwrite corporate bonds, effect securities transactions, and invest in eq-
uities for their own account all under one roof.99 Switzerland, Belgium,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands have similar banking systems. In
France, investment banks are permitted to accept deposits, and in Great
Britain, commercial banks operate investment banking subsidiaries. 100
The economic benefits offered by commercial bank entry into the in-
vestment banking business are substantial. Commercial bank securities
investment services have already demonstrated the ability of banks to at-
tract many small investors who would not enter the securities markets
otherwise and to lower transactional costs for individual investors.' 01
Commercial bank entry into the underwriting business would drive down
the price of underwriting fees'02 and thus increase the number of busi-
nesses that could afford to tap public and private capital markets. Com-
panies too small to get the attention of investment bankers and too big to
rely on bank credit for all their financing would be the primary benefi-
ciaries. 103 Senator William Proxmire acknowledged the competitive ben-
efits of commercial bank underwriting activities in urging support for a bill
to permit banks to underwrite municipal revenue bonds. "The availabil-
ity of bank underwriting," he said, "has enabled municipalities to secure
the most favorable rate on their general obligation borrowing . . . . By
99. Merchant Banking. Is the US. Readyfor It? The German Example, Bus. WEEK,
April 19, 1976, at 89; Miilhaupt, In Defense of Universal Banks, THE BANKER 775 (July
1976).
100. H. Terrell, Activities Permitted to Commercial Banks in Selected Foreign Countries
(1972) (unpublished paper prepared for the Division of International Finance, Federal Re-
serve Board).
101. The Legality of Bank-Sponsored Investment Services, 84 YALE L.J. 1477, 1480-83
(1975). But see Market Place: Banks as Stockbrokers- Little Success, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25,
1977, § D, at 2, col. 3.
102. An investment analyst at Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith indicated in a tele-
phone conversation that the firm's commissions on corporate underwritings, where it does
not face bank competition, were substantially higher than its commissions on municipal
general obligation bond underwriting, where it does compete with banks. A number of
studies have concluded that bank competition in the underwriting of government revenue
securities would lower interest costs and ultimately benefit the public. See e.g., S. REP. No.
93-1120, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
103. Merchant Banking. Is the U.S. Readyfor It supra note 98, at 69. According to a
survey by the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, major Wall Street firms will not
underwrite firms with less than $1 million in profits. Wash. Post, Feb. 11, 1978, § C, at 8,
col. 2.
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excluding commercial banks from the revenue bond underwriting market,
the Glass-Steagall Act stifles competition in this market and causes munic-
ipalities to pay a higher rate of interest on their revenue bond issues. ' 1°4
Publicly held and private companies should be allowed to benefit from
commercial bank underwriting as well.
Current economic circumstances justify a reappraisal of the costs of ex-
cluding commercial banks from investment banking. American business
and governments are making unprecedented demands for capital, and
many economic forecasters predict capital shortages in the next decade. 105
The ability of the securities industry to satisfy these capital demands has
been questioned. 10 6 Commercial banks, through their extensive branch
networks and expertise, could play an important role in raising new capital
and allocating it efficiently if the fetish of Glass-Steagall were discarded.
Far-reaching reform of the regulatory environment in which commer-
cial and investment bankers operate has answered many of the concerns
which prompted Glass-Steagall. Public confidence in the banking system
is assured by federal deposit insurance, which protects depositors against
bank failure up to $40,000 per account. 107 Bank supervision and exami-
nations are more comprehensive and are designed to detect incipient de-
partures into unsafe banking practices.'0 8 The quality of bank investment
portfolios is closely monitored by bank examiners, 10 9 who now have the
authority to examine bank affiliates. 01 Transactions between commercial
banks and their affiliates are strictly regulated."' Unduly speculative
104. 119 CONG. REC. 17738 (1973).
105. See note 14, supra.
106. See [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 91, at 180; J. STONE, ONE
WAY FOR WALL STREET; A VIEW OF THE FUTURE OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY (1975).
107. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(m) (1976).
108. National banks are examined at least three times every two years by the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency and are also subject to examination by the Federal Reserve Board and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. State member banks of the Federal Reserve
System are examined periodically by the Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC, and state bank-
ing authorities. Insured non-member banks are examined by the FDIC and state banking
authorities. 12 U.S.C. §§ 481, 483, 325, & 1820 (1976). See COMPTROLLER OF THE CUR-
RENCY, THE COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK FOR NATIONAL BANK EXAMINERS (1977); COMP-
TROLLER GENERAL, FEDERAL SUPERVISION OF STATE AND NATIONAL BANKS 7-1 through
7-25 (Jan. 1977).
109. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.12 (1977); Remarks by 0. Carney, NewApproach to Invest-
ment Portfolio Examinations, American Bankers Association Bank Investments Conference,
(Feb. 9, 1978).
110. 12 U.S.C. § 481 (1976).
111. Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, enacted as part of the Banking Act of 1933,
limits a bank's transactions with a single affiliate to no more than 10% of the bank's capital
and surplus and limits transactions with all affiliates to no more than 20% of the bank's
capital and surplus. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1976).
[Vol. 27:743
Commercial Bank Private Placement Activity
bank investments are curbed by federal and state laws which impose strict
fiduciary standards on bank management of trust funds. At the same
time, securities investors are protected by an array of disclosure and anti-
fraud statutes designed to eliminate self-dealing and undisclosed conflicts
of interest. The Securities Act of 1933 prohibits false or misleading infor-
mation disseminated in connection with the offer and sale of securities. 12
The Securites Exchange Act of 1934 condemns manipulative practices in
securities markets' l1 and strictly regulates the extension of credit for the
purchase of securities.' ' 4 Rules promulgated by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission require brokers and dealers to consider their custom-
ers' financial situation and needs in recommending particular securities. 115
Exchange rules require brokers to use "due diligence" in executing market
orders at the best price available." 6 Investors are protected against bro-
ker-dealer insolvency by the Securities Investor Protection Act," 7 which
provides the functional equivalent of federal deposit insurance. Although
commercial banks currently are exempt from SEC enforcement of all but
the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws," 18 they are subject to simi-
lar regulations enforced by the bank regulatory agencies." 9
112. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12, & 17, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 77q (1976).
113. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976); Rule 10b-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
114. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1976).
115. Id., § 15b, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1976), Rule 15blO-3; 17 C.F.R. § 240.15blO-3 (1977).
116. NYSE Rule 123, 2 NYSE GUIDE (CCH) $ 2123 (1976); Amex Rule 156, 2 AMEX
GUIDE (CCH) 9156 (1976).
117. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-1ll (1976). The Securities Investor Protection Corporation
(SIPC) is a nonprofit insurance corporation whose members are all registered brokers and
dealers. Customers' securities are insured by SIPC up to $50,000.
118. Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1976); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, §§ 3(a)(4) & (5), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(4) & (5); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, reh. denied, 407 U.S. 916, 408 U.S. 931 (1972); Carroll v. First Nat'l
Bank of Lincolnwood, 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970).
119. The Securities Act Amendments of 1975 require bank regulatory agencies to issue
substantially similar regulations to those administered by the SEC in effectuating the regis-
tration, reporting, and proxy requirements of §§ 12, 13, and 14 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78/(i) (1976). The bank agencies' regulations may deviate from
the SEC's only if similar regulations are "not necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for protection of investors." Whether the bank exemption from SEC jurisdiction should
continue is a much discussed question. See Butera, Bank Exemption From the 1933 Securi-
ties Act, 93 BANKING L.J. 432 (1976); Evans, Regulation of Bank Securities Activities, 91
BANKING L.J. 611 (1974); Garrett, SEC and its Concern With Bank Trust Activities, 113
TRUST & ESTATES 280 (1974); Greenberg, Banks and the Federal Securities Laws: Some
Recent Developments, 49 So. CALIF. L. REV. 665 (1976). Legislation has been introduced to
subject certain bank securities activities to SEC regulation, e.g., S. 2707, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973) (a bill by Senator Brooke to subject commercial bank automatic stock investment
plans to SEC jurisdiction). In a recent study of bank securities activities, the SEC officially
recommended the retention of the bank exemption from the definition of "broker" and
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These statutory reforms have not eliminated all investment risks. They
have insulated the small depositor from the hazards of commercial bank
failures, however, and insured that investment decisions made by banks
and individuals will be intelligent and untainted by self-dealing or hidden
conflicts of interest. That Glass-Steagall contains an ambiguous view
of financial risks assumed by commercial banks is clear in any event.
The Act blesses commercial bank underwriting of municipal securities,
such as New York City bonds, 120 while condemning less risky investments
such as AT&T or Exxon bonds. Commercial banks were unencumbered
by Glass-Steagall in making risky loans to foreign countries 121 and
offering financial and other support to Real Estate Investment
Trusts-REIT'sI22-in recent years. These bank risks have not under-
mined public confidence in the general health of the banking system. 123
A degree of risk is present in all bank investments. 124 Political attempts to
minimize risk-taking tend to entrench large and healthy businesses, fore-
stall new entrants, and hinder the rehabilitation of faltering competitors. 125
If Congress remains fearful that unforeseen hazards might emerge by an
"dealer" under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(4) & (5) (1976).
The SEC also recommended, however, that federal bank regulatory agencies be mandated
to enact and enforce specific regulations governing bank brokerage and dealer activities
comparable to those enforced by the SEC with respect to non-bank institutions. SECURi-
TIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT ON BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES, re-
printed in SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, REPORTS ON
BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 289, 307-08
(Comm. Print 1977).
120. See New York Financial Crisis, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 568-639 (1975) (statements by federal bank
regulators concerning bank exposure to a default by New York City on its municipal obliga-
tions).
121. E.g., Peru Appears on the Verge of Defaulting on Foreign Loans, Wash. Post, Mar.
14, 1978, at AI0, col. 1.
122. See REITs." More Casualties Ahead, Bus. WEEK, June 13, 1977, at 106.
123. A 1976 Gallup poll showed that 93% of those interviewed had confidence in the
basic health of the banking system. Wall St. J., April 30, 1976, at 4, col. 3.
124. Banks incur risks when they make loans in the ordinary course of business.
Twenty-six banks which made loans to W.T. Grant & Co., for example, lost approximately
$500 million when that company went bankrupt. Wash. Post, February 28, 1978, § D, at 8,
col. 3.
125. The "prudent man" rule of the 1974 Pension Reform Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1976),
for example, has operated to artificially confine the investment of pension funds in blue chip
securities to the disadvantage of new and innovative smaller companies. Recent hearings
by the Senate Select Committee on Small Business revealed that the number of companies
making their first public offering-mostly new, small enterprises-dropped from 62% of all
issues offered in 1972, to 16% in 1976. Wash. Post, Feb. 11, 1978, § C, at 8, col. 2. The
social and economic utility of risk capital was recognized by the introduction of legislation
in 1 077 to permit pension managers to invest a portion of the $200 billion of private pension
assets in small and medium size companies which pose a higher than normal degree of risk.
S. 285, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); 123 CONG. REC. S864 (daily ed., Jan. 18, 1977).
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immediate emancipation of commercial banks from Glass-Steagall, it
could reduce the Act's prohibitions gradually to afford itself time to evalu-
ate the results. As interim measures to safeguard against excessive risk-
taking, Congress could limit bank underwriting to a specified percentage
of total bank capital, circumscribe the types of securities eligible for bank
underwriting, or levy FDIC fees according to the risk exposure of individ-
ual banks, rather than continue the uniform fee system now in effect. 126
Opponents of commercial bank entry into investment banking claim
that it would have destructive effects on the competitive structure of the
financial industry.' 27 They assert that the initial benefits from increased
competition would be offset in the long run by industry domination by a
few big banks and the disappearance of all but a few large investment
banking firms which would be driven into the commercial banking busi-
ness in order to remain competitive. That view, however, ignores the al-
ready highly concentrated structure of the securities industry. 28 It also
fails to take into account the antitrust restraints on commercial and invest-
ment banks that prohibit anti-competitive mergers, 29 predatory prac-
tices, 130  monopolization and attempts to monopolize,' 3' tying
arrangements, 32 and exclusive dealing. 133 Additional competitive safe-
guards could easily be adapted to insure the maintenance of healthy com-
petition in investment banking if the barrier of Glass-Steagall were
126. See Scott & Mayer, Risk and Regulation in Banking- Some Proposals/or Federal
Deposit Insurance Reform, 23 STAN. L. REV. 857, 886 (1971).
127. H. Angermueller & M. Taylor, Commercial vs. Investment Bankers, 55 HARV. Bus.
REV. 132, 141-43 (1977); Securities Industry Association, Bank Securities Activities: Memo-
randumfor Study and Discussion, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 751, 784-88 (1977).
128. An estimated 7% of New York Stock Exchange firms account for well over one-half
of the securities business conducted with the public, according to the Securities Industry
Association. S14 Officials Gloomy Over Merger Trend, Wash. Post, Dec. 1, 1977, § F, at 13.
See also The Shakeout on Wall Street Isn't Over Yet, FORTUNE, May 22, 1978, at 59.
129. Clayton Act, § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976); Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1976);
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). But see United States v.
Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418
U.S. 656 (1974); No Litigation by Justice to Contest Bank Mergers, Legal Times of Wash.,
June 5, 1978, at 23.
130. Sherman Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976); Robinson-Patman Act, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 13a
(1976).
131. Sherman Act, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976); United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
132. Sherman Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976); Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States
Steel, 394 U.S. 495 (1969); Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, § 106, 12
U.S.C. § 1972 (1976).
133. Clayton Act, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976); Standard Oil of Calif. v. United States, 337
U.S. 293 (1949).
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lifted. 134 Congress might require, for example, that all commercial bank
entry into investment banking be by de novo expansion rather than by
acquisition of existing firms. 135
Investment bankers nevertheless point to economic advantages pos-
sessed by commercial banks which would make competition between the
two unfair. 136 Commercial banks have direct access to low cost capital,
they claim, while investment bankers must borrow at high interest rates,
often from banks, to finance their operations.137 This argument, however,
supports liberalized entry into commercial banking by investment bankers,
not adherence to artificial barriers which insulate both sectors from the
beneficial spur of competition.
The threat of conflicts of interest arising from commercial bank entry
into investment banking remains a concern of many observers. 138 Such
speculative threats do not outweigh the proven economic benefits of com-
mercial bank participation in securities markets, however, and can be
avoided without the blunderbuss approach of Glass-Steagall.139 Congress
has tolerated potential conflicts of interest in commercial banking when
their elimination would destroy public benefits. Banks may be tempted to
use inside information acquired in their loan departments to make invest-
ment decisions in their trust departments, for example, yet the law does not
condemn the offering of both activities in one institution. 40 The likeli-
hood of abuse is limited by regulations requiring loan and trust operations
to be conducted separately and by the antifraud provisions of the securities
laws. 141 Congress could adopt similar safeguards against potential con-
flicts in the investment banking operations of commercial banks. Banks
134. See, e.g., Competition in Banking Act of 1976, Hearings Before the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on S 2721, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
135. PUBLIC POLICY ASPECTS OF BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES, supra note 26, at 31-32.
136. Commercial vs. Investment Bankers, supra note 127, at 139-40; Bank Securities Activ-
ities, supra note 127, at 777-84.
137. Broker-dealers owed large New York City banks $4 billion as of June 30, 1975. 62
FED. RES. BULL., Feb. 1976, at app. 16.
138. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 30634-35 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Hart).
139. For a rebuttal of the conflicts of interest argument against commercial bank in-
volvement in private placement activities, see New York Clearing House Association, Com-
mercial Bank Private Placement Advisory Services, An Analysis of the Public Policy and
Legal Issues, at 25-26.
140. 12 U.S.C. § 92a (1976).
141. The Comptroller of the Currency recently issued a ruling requiring national banks
to adopt written policies and procedures to ensure that their trust departments do not make
any recommendations to purchase or sell any security on the basis of material inside infor-
mation. 43 FED. REG. 6759 (Feb. 16, 1978). See also the Federal Reserve Board's policy
statement declaring the use of material inside information by state member banks in connec-
tion with any decision to purchase or sell securities to be an unsafe and unsound banking
practice. 46 U.S.L.W. 2515 (April 4, 1978).
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also could be prohibited from selling securities underwritten or dealt in by
them to any of their trust accounts. Sales of securities by a bank to any of
its depositors, borrowers, or correspondent banks could be accompanied
by a mandatory statement disclosing the fact that the bank is acting as an
underwriter or dealer in the securities.' 42 Other potential conflicts of in-
terest could similarly be dealt with through disclosure. 43
V. CONCLUSION
The Glass-Steagall Act was the offspring of public hostility against
bankers and a legitimate concern for bank safety following the collapse of
a fundamentally flawed banking system in the wake of the 1929 stock mar-
ket crash. Its attempt to define the proper role of commercial and invest-
ment banks imposed an artificial barrier between the two sectors which
has impeded the ability of the financial industry to efficiently service the
nation's growing capital needs. Neither the courts nor the federal bank
regulatory agencies have discovered a satisfactory way to remain faithful
to the Act's language and purposes while permitting commercial banking
practices that promise to yield substantial public benefits. The defini-
tional gymnastics performed by the Federal Reserve Board's study in seek-
ing to legitimize commercial bank private placement services under Glass-
Steagall stretched the Act's language to the breaking point and demon-
strated the need for Congressional review of its philosophical underpin-
nings.
Comprehensive regulation of commercial and investment banking insti-
tutions has made the Glass-Steagall Act's concern over bank safety and
potential abuses largely irrelevant. Existing regulatory vehicles could eas-
ily be adapted to answer any new concerns over commercial bank partici-
pation in investment banking. Rising capital demands and the inability of
all but the largest businesses to tap capital markets makes additional com-
petition in the financial markets increasingly imperative. Congress should
permit a remarriage of commercial and investment banking as one step in
142. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (SEC may
obtain injunction compelling investment adviser to disclose to his client a practice of
purchasing shares of a security for his own account shortly before recommending that secur-
ity for long-term investment and then immediately selling his own shares at a profit upon
the rise in market price following the recommendation).
143. See Overdrafts and Correspondent Banking Practices, Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 415-19 (1977) (state-
ment of Roy A. Schotland, Georgetown University Law Center, urging greater disclosure
requirements for banking institutions). See generally Financial Disclosure By Banks and
Bank Holding Companies, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Ur-
ban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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the removal of artificial barriers to the fimancial industry's ability to meet
the nation's economic needs.
Melanie L. Fein*
* During the writing of this article, the author was employed as a law clerk in the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency. The views expressed herein are those of the author and
do not reflect the position of that Office.
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